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I. INTRODUCTION
Something is happening when IBM holds its annual investor briefing
in 2006 in Bangalore, India rather than in an American city.' IBM has
increased staffing in India and China from 13,200 employees in 2003 to
50,200 in 2006, which is almost a 400% increase.2 If these numbers were
isolated then perhaps the response would be more muted. But amid great
publicity, both Cisco and Microsoft announced similar expansions. Bill
Gates, CEO of Microsoft, promised to "invest $1.7 billion and create 3,000
jobs."'3 Cisco pledged a $1.1 billion investment in India as well. 4 Nor is
* Beverley Earle has a B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and a J.D. from Boston
University School of Law. She is a Professor in the Law, Taxation and Financial Planning
Department at Bentley College and the McCallum Graduate School of Business. She is a
fellow at the Bentley Center for Business Ethics. Gerald A. Madek has a B.A. from Boston
College, a J.D. from Suffolk University School of Law and an LL.M. from Boston
University School of Law. He is a professor in the Law, Taxation and Financial Planning
Department at Bentley College and the McCallum Graduate School of Business. Christina
Madek has a B.A. from Boston College and a J.D. from Suffolk University School of Law.
She is an associate with Jantzen & Associates, P.C., Boston, MA.
1 Steve Hanem, Big Blue Shift, Bus. WK., June 5, 2006, at 108 (discussing IBM's new
strategy of expanding to developing countries).
2 Id. (noting, however, that centers are being maintained in Tulsa, Oklahoma for clients
who want "the tasks done in the U.S."). IBM will actually triple its investment in India. Id.
3 Brier Dudley, Gates Touts New Jobs in India, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at El
(discussing expansion plans in India). Gates carefully points out that although the
percentage increase in Microsoft's workforce is larger in India than in the United States
(19% versus 4%, respectively), Microsoft is still adding more jobs in absolute terms in the
United States. Only about 750 jobs are being added per year in India, whereas 1,600-2,000
jobs were added in the United States in 2005 alone. However, Dudley also notes that
Microsoft has been selling software in India since 1990 and developing products in the
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:89 (2007)
India the only destination for outsourcing-China has also become a center
of outsourcing for many companies.5
Many people, not just in the United States, are concerned about the
implications of this growth in outsourcing for the future of business. State
governments in particular are trying to stop outsourcing and are using the
law as a means to do so. However, are these attempts, which are variants of
the old "buy American" programs, doomed to be ineffective and ultimately
protectionist, without really protecting American business? This paper will
examine the developments of offshoring, outsourcing, and insourcing in
Part II. Part III examines both state and federal legal efforts to restrict this
growth. Part IV examines the WTO and international responses to these
developments. Part V examines the Supreme Court's analysis of tax
incentives as a way to attract business to U.S. states. Part VI concludes
with an analysis of what might be more efficacious ways to address
outsourcing than the misguided attempts to date.
II. THE DILEMMA OF OUTSOURCING
Thomas Friedman, author of the seminal book, The World is Flat,
defined outsourcing as "taking some specific, but limited, function that your
company was doing in-house-such as research, call centers, or accounts
receivable-and having another company perform that exact same function
for you and then reintegrating their work back into your overall operation.",
6
Many confuse the words "outsourcing" and "offshoring." Friedman
defines offshoring: "Offshoring . . . is when a company takes one of its
factories that is operating in Canton, Ohio, and moves the whole factory
offshore to Canton, China. There, it produces the very same product in the
very same way, only with cheaper labor, lower taxes, subsidized energy,
and lower health-care costs."
7
Both of these practices are of grave concern to the United States in the
21 st Century. The Director of McKinsey China stated that: "Two-thirds of
California's manufacturing will move to China and India.",8  While this
figure may be shocking, the pressures of finding low cost production are not
the only forces pushing manufacturing overseas. World demographics
suggest there may be another interest. For example, the median age in India
is only twenty-four, while in the United States it is thirty-seven, in China it
Indian city of Hyderabad since 1998. Additionally, Microsoft is beginning to open retail
outlets in India. Gates is revered in India and even has a rap song in his honor. Id.
4 Id.
5 See Watch Out India, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2006, at 69.
6 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT 137 (2006).
7 Id.
8 Meeting with Dr. Jonathan Woetzel, Dir, McKinsey & Co. Greater China Office, June
25, 2006 (notes on file with author).
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is thirty-four, and in Europe it is thirty-nine. 9 India has seventeen percent
of the world's population and this will be at the age when consumption is
peak. Wal-Mart sourced from China for both global and local markets $18
billion in 2004 and expects to source $30 billion in 2008.' o As Ronald
Haddock of the global consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton stated: "China
is not a question of whether to participate, but of how.""
Individuals and companies who believe they can stop time or
somehow insulate the United States and its people from these forces are
woefully misinformed. People who harbor the belief that China is still part
of the Third World have not visited Shanghai recently. Yes, there are
problems of traffic and pollution, but one cannot help but be struck by the
energy and hunger of people to move forward. The iron rice bowl appears
dead. It seems like all workers-from professors to tour guides and hotel
clerks-care deeply about their jobs and how they are evaluated. Compared
to how it was under the strict Communist regime of the past, workers now
know that they could lose their positions in the more open modem regime .
As a result, market surveys are everywhere-at baggage claim, at the hotel
and at the airport. Ten percent growth per year over ten years has led to an
extraordinary transformation of Chinese cities.
More importantly, the cost of wages in the United States coupled with
the cost of pensions and health care have made the U.S. business
environment decidedly unattractive. No one can argue that it is bad for
workers to have the safety net of such programs, but how sustainable are
these costs given the availability of less expensive alternatives abroad?
While the United States is not alone in struggling with this dilemma, newer
economies without traditions of worker welfare programs have more
flexibility to innovate. Thomas Friedman noted:
Virtually every entrepreneur I talked to for this book cited soaring
9 Sumit Majumdar, The Dynamics of Institutional Change in India, in 48TH ANN.
MEETING OF THE ACAD. OF INT'L Bus. (June 25, 2006).
10 Ronald Haddock, Vice President & Dir., Booz Allen Hamilton Greater China,
Presentation at the Academy of International Business [AIB]: Global Sourcing (June 24,
2006) (noting also that "regulatory changes will continue to drive China's economic
expansion") (slides/notes on file with the author). But cf Mei Fong, Chinese Rules May Tie
Up Foreign Retailers, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2006, at A6 (discussing how China's draft
regulations putting additional restrictions on the location of big stores in China would affect
expansion plans of foreign retailers).
1 Haddock, supra note 11. Compare FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 114 (identifying ten
forces that flattened the world, including: the fall of the Berlin wall, when Netscape went
public, work flow software, uploading, outsourcing, offshoring, supply chaining, insourcing,
in-forming the steroids (chips etc.)). Friedman also discusses what he calls the "triple
convergence": global, horizontal, and the new people from all the developing countries.
12 Interview with group of professors, Jiatong University, Antai School of Management
(June 27, 2006) ("One half of salary is based upon incentives.") (notes on file with author).
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and uncontrolled health-care costs in America as a reason to move
factories abroad to countries where benefits were more limited, or
nonexistent, or where there was national health insurance . . . In a
flattening world, where worker security can no longer be guaranteed
by Fortune 500 corporations with top-down pension and health
plans, we need more collaborative solutions-among government,
labor, and business-that will promote self-reliant workers but not
just leave them to fend for themselves. 13
The current myth suggests that only low cost jobs are being outsourced
-such as the shoe factory from Maine whose viability ended long ago. Yet
that too is misguided. Both China and India, or "Chindia," are poised to
move up the value chain by offering professional services in research and
development as well as professional devices like accounting, law, tax, and
engineering at a lower cost and equally high quality.14 Outsourcing results
in changes to the entire business process that can result in enormous
efficiencies. This is also known as "transformational outsourcing."' 15 As
Pete Engardio wrote:
Many executives are discovering outsourcing is really about
corporate growth, making better use of skilled U.S. staff, and job
creation in the U.S., not just cheap wages abroad. True, the labor
savings from global sourcing can still be substantial. But it's peanuts
compared to the enormous gains in efficiency, productivity, quality,
and revenues that can be achieved by fully leveraging offshore
talent. 16
There are some real efficiencies with outsourcing. One commentator
noted "[Companies that try offshoring] are keen to liberate expensive
[talent] . . . so they can spend more time innovating.' 17 Noted areas of
13 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 371. But cf Paul Krugman, Divided Over Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2007, at A23 (discussing how international trade can be a threat to U.S. jobs.
He also noted, "But if Democrats really want to help American workers, they'll have to do it
with a pro-labor policy that relies on better tools than trade policy. Universal health care,
paid for by taxing the economy's winners, would be a good place to start."); accord Milt
Freudenheim, New Urgency in Debating Healthcare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at Cl
(quoting J. Randall MacDonald, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, IBM (stating
"[f]ive years from now this problem [of health insurance] will have to be cured, or the
competitiveness of the United States will be dramatically affected")).
14 Peter Marsh, A New Manufacturing Mantra, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at Business
Life 12 (discussing the "tear-down" center in Chennai that reverse engineers cars).
15 See Pete Engardio, The Future of Outsourcing, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 2006, at 50
(discussing the brutal impact of outsourcing and how companies adjust, compete, or go
bankrupt).
16 1d. at 51.
17 Id. at 55.
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outsourcing are: Human resources, Engineering, Info tech, Analytics,
Customer care, Manufacturing, Finance and accounting, Logistics and
accounting.' 8  Many people underestimate both China's and India's
business acumen, preferring to believe that "American know-how" will be
sufficient to maintain an edge in business growth.
In fact, the campaign against outsourcing has a familiar historical
antecedent. The English Parliament, concerned about the woolen
merchants, prohibited cotton from being used in all but the summer months:
"[A]ll persons whatsoever to wear no garment . . . but what is made of
sheep's wool . . . from the feast of All Saints to the Feast of the
Annunciation."' 19 This may sound like a laughable proposal, yet in 1699,
another English law required judges and professors to wear woolen robes.2 °
Even the dead, who could least object, were the subject of legislation
requiring burial in woolen garments. 21 Desperation about job loss and
financial ruin prompted even more legislative action in 1701. The new law
required that "all calicos . . . imported [from Persia, China or the East
Indies]. . . shall not be worn or otherwise used within the Kingdom of
England., 22  Yet this still allowed plain cotton to be imported, which
ultimately stimulated the British dying and printing business. In 1722 it
even became illegal to wear or use cotton cloth.23
In a global world, even in the 1700's, Great Britain's approach could
not erect a fence to trade. Britain's business moguls ultimately found a way
to prosper in the cotton business and their country was freed from the itchy
strictures of wool.
Yet this positive view of outsourcing and an acceptance of its
inevitability is best countered by an unlikely protectionist-the former free
trader and former candidate for President, Senator John Kerry. In a
campaign stump speech, Kerry infamously labeled CEOs as Benedict
Arnolds. He reportedly stated that America seeks:
[A] prosperity where we will reduce poverty of millions rather than
reducing the taxation of millionaires. A prosperity where we create
jobs here at home and where we shut down every loophole, every
incentive, every reward that goes to some Benedict Arnold CEO of a
18 Id. at 54-55. These were some of the biggest sectors in terms of global spending in
2005.
19 PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIST
EXAMINES THE MARKETS, POWER, AND POLITICS OF WORLD TRADE 154 (2005) (citing P.J.
THOMAS, MERCANTILISM AND THE EAST INDIA TRADE 62 (1963)).
20 Id. (citing BEVERLY LEMIRE, FASHION'S FAVOURITE: THE COTTON TRADE AND THE
CONSUMER IN BRITAIN 25 (1992)).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 155 (quoting LEMIRE, supra note 23, at 31).
23 Id. at 156 (discussed in LEMIRE, supra note 23, at 31).
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company that takes the jobs overseas and sticks America with the
bill."
This was a good media sound bite but it underscores a view held by
many that there should be punitive sanctions on companies that globalize
their production and operations.
Yet it is not just outsourcing that has caused the loss of jobs. As one
expert noted, technology may be the bigger culprit:
While employment is falling, production is steady or even rising...
While the textile trade regime has had some effect in keeping
production in the United States by increasing the price of imports,
the stated goal of the regime-to save manufacturing jobs-has been
undermined much more by mechanization and technological
progress than by foreign competition.
25
However, it may be easier to blame the Benedict Arnolds than to face
how the global revolution has forever affected the world and that the 20th
Century, with the hallmark of unchallenged American superiority, is over.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSES: ATTEMPTS TO
RESTRICT OUTSOURCING
While globalization is based on the premise that free trade will
increase prosperity for all participating economies in the long term, the
clear short-term result of this policy for some U.S. workers is distress.
Predictably, these displaced workers, and their political representatives, are
not solaced by the promise of future national and global gain. In fact, the
short-term pain caused by globalization has aroused strong chauvinistic
responses on both the state and federal level. This chauvinistic impulse to
protect American workers and promote American goods has resulted in
myriad attempts by both state and federal legislators to prevent outsourcing
or offshoring of Americanjobs. This mass of legislative proposals, some of
which have actually become law, pulls strongly against the natural effect of
globalization. In part, this protectionism is wrongheaded, but, in part, it is a
response to the inadequacy of our current statutory framework for
effectively regulating the new global economy. The existing statutes were
written for a simpler time and need to be systematically and coherently
updated to coalesce more logically with today's free trade climate.
Unfortunately, however, the current rash of state and national legislation
does not accomplish this task in a way that is logical-or, in some cases,
24 News Watch, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 2004, at B5.
25 RtvOLi, supra note 22, at 141 (emphasis in original) (examining the impact of
globalization on trade by following a t-shirt around the world as it is made and marketed).
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constitutional. A look at the types of legislation proposed on the state and
national level will show the ways in which these laws converge around
several anti-outsourcing strategies. Most of the state legislation will not
likely prevail because of jurisdictional and constitutional issues. Much of
the federal legislation will not likely prevail because this legislation clashes
with international trade agreements that the United States has signed. The
following analysis will illustrate these realities.
For the two-year span that ended in October 2005, 327 bills aiming to
restrict outsourcing in direct or indirect ways, were introduced in forty
states.26 Twelve such bills actually became law, while governors vetoed
seven such laws.27 In addition, three laws requiring establishment of
commissions to study the problem of outsourcing were passed and seven
governors issued executive orders limiting outsourcing.2 8 From these many
bills, one can identify five basic approaches to curtailing the loss of
American jobs. Most of these approaches can be found in the successful
bills-now laws. These same approaches are mirrored in the pending bills.
In addition, many of these strategies for curtailing outsourcing are also
found in existing federal statutes and in pending legislation. A review of
these strategies, as illustrated in the laws passed to date, will give a clear
picture of what shape America's protectionist backlash has taken.
A. Outright Bans on Outsourcing at the State Level
Only one state to date has passed a law that establishes an outright ban
on outsourcing. In May 2005, New Jersey's governor signed what is
26 See Global Sourcing Information, National Foundation for American Policy,
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/globalsourcing/summary/StatesListSummary2005.p
df (noting state proposals restricting outsourcing).
21 See 2005 Cal. Stat. 1741 (addressing the flow of voter information in California); 2005
Colo. Sess. Laws. 1307 (providing in state preference for agricultural products in Colorado);
2005 Ill. Laws 1723 (providing preference for U.S. products in Illinois); 2005 Md. Laws.
514 (prohibiting action of Governor in Maryland); 2005 N.J. Laws. 494 (prohibiting state
contract work outside the United States in New Jersey); 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws. 169
(requiring disclosure in North Carolina); 2005 N.D. Laws. 1091 (mandating instate
preference in North Dakota); 2004 Ala. Acts. 234 (addressing use of professional services in
Alabama); 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws. 1373 (creating contractual requirements in Colorado);
2004 Ind. Acts. 1080 (providing in preference for in state companies in Indiana); 2004 N.C.
Sess. Laws. 1414 (preferencing domestic products in North Carolina); 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
2344 (addressing data entry issues in Tennessee); 2004 Cal. Stat. 1451 (vetoed); 2004 Cal.
Stat. 1829 (vetoed); 2004 Cal. Stat. 3021 (vetoed); 2004 Cal. Stat. 2715 (vetoed); 2004 Md.
Laws. 183 (vetoed); 2004 Mass. Acts. 4850 § 21 (vetoed).
28 2005 Me. Laws. 47; 2005 N.J. Laws. 184; 2005 Wash. Laws. 8407; Ala. Admin. Order
No. 216 (Aug. 5, 2004); Florida Exec. Order No. 04-45 (Mar. 11, 2004); Mich. Exec. Order
2004-2 (Mar. 22, 2004); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2004-3 (Mar. 22, 2004); Minn. Exec. Order
No. 04-02 (Mar. 29, 2004); Mo. Exec. Order No. 04-09 (Mar. 17, 2004); N.C. Exec. Order
No. 60 (June 1, 2004).
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currently the nation's most restrictive protectionist measure. 29  This bill
flatly prohibits state contract work from being performed outside the United
States. Despite a vehement effort by lobbyists for the Indian government,
public pressure seemingly forced passage of this law, suggesting that angry
constituents are a significant force behind this protectionism.3  However,
while New Jersey's law effectively eliminates outsourcing or offshoring of
government contracts, this statute obviously does not prevent private
companies operating in New Jersey from outsourcing work. Interestingly,
of the 127 bills introduced in state legislatures in 2005, twenty-six bills also
propose an outright ban on outsourcing state contract work.3' Some of
these proposed bans in fact have more restrictive twists, such as the South
Dakota bill that proposes that work on state contracts can only be
performed by persons authorized to work in the United States.32
B. Legal Validity of State Bans on Outsourcing
In a legal sense, outright bans on outsourcing for state contracts are
likely doomed because they interfere with both the U.S. Government's
foreign affairs power 33 and the Foreign Commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 34 Legal precedent holds that the U.S. Constitution grants to
the President and Congress the power to create and uphold a coherent
foreign affairs policy. Thus, any state statute that interferes with this
federal right would be preempted by the federal government's prerogative
to set foreign affairs policy.
35
The outright bans on outsourcing for state contracts all appear to
contravene this federal right for two reasons. On one hand, the federal
29 2005 N.J. Laws. 494.
30 Mark B. Baker, "The Technology Dog Ate My Job": The Dog-Eat-Dog World of
Offshore Labor Outsourcing, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 807, 827 (2004). Upon discovering that the
company which processed benefits cards for New Jersey welfare recipients had moved its
customer service operations to Mumbai, New Jersey Senator Turner introduced a bill to ban
such outsourcing. See id. at 828-29. After unanimous approval from the Senate, pressure
from lobbyists for India stalled the bill in the state assembly. See id. at 829. Public pressure,
however, not only resulted in ultimate passage of the bill, but also caused the company in
question, eFunds, to move its call center back to New Jersey to avoid losing state contracts in
the future. Id.
31 See National Foundation for American Policy, 2005 - Table Tracking State Bills to
Restrict Global Sourcing, http://www.nfap.net/researchactivities/globalsourcing/appendix
2005.aspx [hereinafter Global Sourcing Table].
32 H. 1116, 2004 Legis. Assemb., 79th Sess. (S.D. 2004); SHANNON KLINGER & M. LYNN
SYKES, THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY, EXPORTING THE LAW: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL OUTSOURCING LEGISLATION 4 (2004), available at
http://www.nfap.net/researchactivities/studies/NFAPStudyExportingLaw_0404.pdf.
33 See KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 35, at 6.
34 Id. at 4.
" Id. at 6.
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government has signed onto many free trade agreements, including the
World Trade Organization's Uruguay Round Agreement on Government
Procurement.36 State laws that create policies banning outsourcing will
clearly interfere with the federal right to create a foreign affairs policy that
supports free trade. On the other hand, even if the federal government did
not presently have a formal policy on outsourcing, formulating such a
policy is clearly a federal right. In this context, states that ban outsourcing
would be setting a policy that contradicts the federal government's silence
on this issue, interfering with the federal government's "dormant foreign
affairs presumption," described in Zschernig v. Miller.37  In essence,
deciding trade policy is simply not a state prerogative.
Judicial precedent supports this analysis of federal prerogative. Three
Supreme Court cases uphold the principle that a state law that contravenes
federal foreign affairs power will be preempted by this power.
The most recent Supreme Court case to emphasize the preeminence of
federal foreign affairs power, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,38 was decided in 2003. In Garamendi, the Court held that
California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act was preempted by the
federal government's foreign affairs power. Here, the California law
mandated that insurance companies doing business in the state report to the
state Insurance Commissioner details about policies they sold during the
Holocaust. The Court found that this disclosure requirement was at odds
with agreements made by the executive branch of the government- and so
were preempted by federal foreign affairs powers.
In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council.39  In Crosby, the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited state entities from doing business with
anyone who had financial dealings with Burma. At the time this statute was
enacted, there were no federal sanctions against Burma. As suggested
36 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english
/docse/legal e/gpr-94.pdf [hereinafter GPA]; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, §§ 341-344, 108 Stat. 4809, 4951-55 (1994) (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2512-2518
(2007) and 7 U.S.C. § 903 (2007) (intending to combat discriminatory provisions, both state
and federal, against multinational suppliers) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreements Act];
see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773 (allowing members to discuss international
competition in order to expand world trade); North American Free Trade Agreement, H.R.
REP. No. 103-361 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552-57 [hereinafter NAFTA]
(addressing trade relations between Mexico and the United States).
" 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see also Baker, supra note 33, at 826 (discussing Zschernig).
38 539 U.S. 396 (2003); see also KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 35, at 6 (illustrating
Garamendi).
39 530 U.S. 363 (2000); see also Baker, supra note 33, at 825-26 (examining Crosby).
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above, however, in the absence of a specific federal policy on an issue, a
dormant federal foreign affairs presumption still exists. In fact, several
months later, the federal government did invoke sanctions that were less
severe than the Massachusetts sanctions. Thus, the Massachusetts statute
interfered with the federal government's ability to set a uniform foreign
policy towards Burma. Although the Massachusetts statute did not overtly
contradict the federal policy, the Court found "implied preemption '40 in the
fact that the more severe Massachusetts sanctions could undermine the
federal government's ability to speak authoritatively on this subject.
The oldest Supreme Court precedent that is relevant to these state bans
on outsourcing is the 1968 case, Zschernig v. Miller.41 In Zschernig, the
Court struck down an Oregon statute that forced people living in foreign
countries to agree in writing not to assign their inheritance of property in
Oregon to a third party. A product of the Cold War, the Oregon statute was
meant to keep Oregon wealth out of Communist hands. As such, the
Supreme Court found that, because the Oregon probate law promulgated a
certain foreign policy and so had the potential to affect international
relations negatively, this statute was preempted by the federal government's
foreign affairs power. As suggested above, in this case, the Oregon statute
fell victim to a dormant foreign affairs presumption, where state laws
cannot articulate foreign policy-even if no federal law exists on the issue.
An analysis of the Court's decisions on state statutes that infringe on
federal foreign affairs power shows that there are several key factors that
the Supreme Court considers in such cases: (1) whether the state statute is
meant to interfere with the affairs of a foreign country; (2) whether the state
statute has the intent and ability to actually affect another country; (3)
whether the state's action might spur more states to formulate statutes
usurping federal powers; (4) whether the state law contradicts federal law
on the issue in any way; and (5) whether targeted countries have
complained.42
Given this analysis, it seems clear that state statutes that purport to ban
outsourcing for state contracts will, if challenged, most likely be found
unconstitutional as a usurpation of federal foreign powers. One
commentator has suggested, given the clear legal analysis on this issue, that
the rush to introduce bills to ban outsourcing actually represents a series of
political moves meant to pander to public outrage over the loss of American
jobs-regardless of whether any of these bills, should they become law, can
survive a constitutional challenge.43 In fact, this political motive sometimes
40 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388; see also Baker, supra note 33, at 825.
41 389 U.S. 429; see also Baker, supra note 33, at 826.
42 KLINGER & SYKEs, supra note 35, at 6 (analyzing considered factors).
43 Baker, supra note 33, at 827 (noting there is a political angle to be had from trying to
take action to protect domestic workers and the domestic economy).
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produces results. In the case of the New Jersey ban on outsourcing, even
before the statute had beaten back intense lobbying efforts by India, the
company involved moved its call center back to New Jersey to avoid the
fallout from making such an unpopular move-and to preserve its ability to
win state contracts in the future.4 It should be noted, however, that if the
United States should ever articulate by statute a clear policy on outsourcing
bans, state laws that do not contradict or go beyond this policy, though
redundant, would likely be upheld.
A subset of federal power over foreign affairs is federal power over
foreign commerce. In fact, the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce.4 5 In
addition, legal precedent makes clear that federal law trumps state law on
issues of foreign commerce.4 6 When a case involves foreign commerce, the
courts routinely subject the state statutes involved to heightened scrutiny to
make certain that the statute does not interfere with national concerns about
foreign commerce. This heightened scrutiny emphasizes the importance, to
the courts and to the federal government, of maintaining uniform foreign
commerce practices. 47 The premise here is the same as in the analysis of
federal foreign affairs powers: the country benefits from a uniform foreign
commerce policy. If states promulgate laws that attempt to meddle with
foreign commerce, the United States as a whole may suffer retaliatory
negative economic effects.48  Given this analysis, a state law that bans
outsourcing is very likely to be declared unconstitutional for interfering
with federal power over foreign commerce.
Another unresolved issue involving state attempts to ban outsourcing
involves the constitutional prohibition of national origin discrimination, as
well as Title VII's prohibition of such discrimination. Private contractors
who outsource state or federal contract work to American workers in other
44 Id. at 828.
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (holding that "an exercise
of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's
policy," because the Constitution places foreign relations power in the hands of the federal
government to ensure uniformity in foreign policy); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999).
47 See KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 35, at 7 (citing Antilles Cement Corp. v. Calderon,
288 F. Supp. 2d 187, 195 (D.P.R. 2003)).
48 See id. at 8.
49 To apply overseas, United States labor statutes must contain a clear statement of
congressional intent to extend the reach of the law overseas. See Justin Kent Holcombe,
Solutions for Regulating Offshore Outsourcing in the Service Sector: Using the Law, Market,
International Mechanisms, and Collective Organizations as Building Blocks, 7 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 539, 577 (2005). In fact, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically inserts such a
statement of congressional intent into Title VII. See id.
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countries might be seen as violating this country's ban on national origin
discrimination if they are found to be discriminating against American
workers because they are American. This may suggest a way in which
federal outsourcing bans conflict with both the U.S. Constitution and with
federal labor laws, and may provide an avenue for displaced workers to
seek redress in the future. One state court case has already upheld such a
claim. In Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc. 50 an American subsidiary of a
Japanese company fired twenty-two American workers and replaced them
with Japanese workers. In this case, the court found that the American
workers were clearly protected by Title VII against discrimination on the
basis of their national origin. 51 This avenue of redress, however, is unlikely
to become a serious threat to outsourcing bans since most U.S. work is
outsourced to non-American workers at the outset.
C. Outright Bans on Outsourcing at the Federal Level
At the federal level, there is no statute that mandates a total prohibition
on outsourcing federal contracts, comparable to New Jersey's ban on
outsourcing state contracts, despite several attempts at enacting such a ban.
In 2004, the United States Workers Protection Act was introduced in both
the House and the Senate but failed to pass.52  This Act prohibited any
federal contract work from being performed overseas, except for cases
where the President decided that such outsourcing was necessary for
national security reasons. The same bill was reintroduced in 2005, but
again failed to become law.53 Likewise, the American Manufacturing Jobs
Retention Act of 200314 proposed a more limited ban on outsourcing jobs
under federal contracts. This bill required that at least 50% of workers on
projects done for U.S. agencies be employed in the United States. As with
both incarnations of the U.S. Workers Protection Act, the American
Manufacturing Jobs Retention Act failed to make it out of congressional
committees.
50 828 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The "market participant" doctrine was developed
in the context of interstate commerce to distinguish between situations where a state was
acting like any private individual who participated in the market and situations where the
state was wielding its power to regulate the market. In Trojan Technologies, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit transmutes this interstate commerce
principle into a foreign commerce principle, holding that Pennsylvania was simply
expressing a preference for a product from specific sources, as any private market participant
might, rather than using the power of the state to influence policy. 916 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir.
1990).
51 Goyette, 282 F. Supp. at 232.
52 United States Workers Protection Act of 2004, S. 2094, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.
3820, 108th Cong. (2004).
53 See United States Workers Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3406, 109th Cong. (2005).
54 American Manufacturing Jobs Retention Act of 2003, H.R. 3134, 108th Cong. (2003).
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One partial ban on outsourcing for federal contracts has been signed
into law-the Thomas-Voinovich Amendment to the 2004 Omnibus
Spending Bill. 5 This statute mandates that an "activity or function of an
Executive agency. . . may not be performed by a contractor outside the
United States."56 The only time when such work can be done outside of the
country is when federal employees have previously completed this work
outside of U.S. borders. The purpose of this ban is to prevent offshore
workers from providing services in a more cost-effective manner than
government workers in this country. The Thomas-Voinovich statute is,
however, very limited in scope since it only covers work done for the U.S.
Treasury Department and the Department of Transportation.5
Another attempt at a large-scale ban on outsourcing federal service
contracts also resulted in a watered-down prohibition. The Dodd
Amendment to the JOBS Act,58 which makes the Thomas-Voinovich
Amendment permanent, was originally written to require that only U.S.
workers perform work for all federal service contracts. However, after
much opposition from Senate Republicans, the amendment as passed
excluded most federal agencies from the outsourcing ban, most notably all
military agencies and homeland security agencies.
5 9
D. Legal Validity of Federal Bans on Outsourcing
Federal bans on outsourcing are obviously analyzed differently than
are state bans. Since the federal government has preeminence in foreign
affairs and foreign commerce, the Thomas-Voinovich Amendment and the
Dodd Amendment do not interfere with federal powers as the New Jersey
outsourcing ban does. Rather, these federal statutes are simply exercising
powers that the Constitution confers on the federal government.
The most important problem for federal bans on outsourcing, however,
is that such bans put the United States in violation of several trade
agreements to which it is a signatory, including the North American Free
Trade Agreement,60 the Uruguay Rounds Agreement, 6' and the World
55 See Baker, supra note 33, at 834.
56 Workers Protection Act of 2005, supra note 56, § 42(a).
57 Baker, supra note 33, at 834.
58 Jumpstart Our Business Strength ("JOBS") Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2004). Senate
Republicans argued that banning the outsourcing of federal service contracts would result in
retaliation by trading partners and would cause the United States to lose more jobs in the
long term than would be saved in the short term. Richard McCormack, A Spirited Debate
Over Outsourcing and Trade: Senate Republicans Dilute Proposal Aimed at Keeping
Government Service Jobs in U.S., 11(6) MFG. & TECH. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/04/0319/art1.html.
59 See JOBS, supra note 61.
60 North America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3301-3473 (2007)).
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Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement ("GPA").62 The
most important of these, in the context of this paper, is the GPA. The GPA
obligates its signatories to treat foreign suppliers, goods, and services
comparably to domestic suppliers, goods, and services.63 This agreement
further prohibits discrimination against domestic suppliers who might have
foreign owners or who supply foreign goods and services. 64 If signatories
pass domestic statutes that conflict with these trade obligations, these
signatories can be found in violation of the GPA.
In recognition of this problem, the Dodd Amendment excludes
signatories of the GPA from its outsourcing prohibitions. However, the
Thomas-Voinovich Amendment does not exclude these signatories, and so
runs afoul of the GPA in several ways. First, the Amendment's mandate to
use domestic workers does not treat foreign firms comparably to domestic
firms, as required by the GPA. Although Thomas-Voinovich requires both
foreign and domestic firms to use domestic workers, the cost of doing so is
much greater for firms whose workers are all based outside of the United
States. Thus, the cost of complying with this statute clearly increases for
firms located outside of the United States, putting these firms at a
competitive disadvantage.65
The second way in which the Thomas-Voinovich Amendment violates
the GPA is by discriminating against U.S. firms who outsource. By
prohibiting contract work from being performed by contractors outside of
the United States, this Amendment excludes American firms who outsource
work from competing for these federal contracts.66  This type of
discrimination, as explained above, is expressly prohibited by the GPA.
Thus, federal bans on outsourcing will likely put the United States in
violation of the GPA, which will cause both negative political and negative
economic fallout.
Interestingly, while the main problems for proposed state outsourcing
bans are constitutional, as described above, these state statutes may also
violate the GPA in the same ways as does the Thomas-Voinovich
Amendment. Klinger and Sykes point out that "because the federal
government has the constitutional authority to act on behalf of the states in
the international arena, and certainly to the extent that states receive federal
monies . . . all states are arguably required to comply with the federal
statutory requirements incorporating the GPA. ' 67
61 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 39.
62 GPA, supra note 39; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 39.
63 GPA, supra note 39, art. 3(1).
64Md. art. 3(2).
65 See KLINGER& SYKEs, supra note 35, at 19.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 18.
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In fact, thirty-seven states have explicitly agreed to abide by GPA
requirements, under a provision that allows sub-national governments to opt
in to the GPA. 68 On the other hand, two recently-enacted state statutes
actually prohibit the governor from agreeing to bind the state by trade
agreements. 69 While these statutes attest to a level of frustration with
outsourcing, they may, as suggested above, be moot in light of federal
authority to act on behalf of the states in these matters.
Clearly, outright bans on outsourcing, on both the state and national
levels, are vulnerable to challenge on a variety of grounds. That so few
outsourcing bans, on either the state or federal levels, have actually become
law is clear evidence that many legislators know this. However, a tug of
war appears to be taking place here. Many Americans instinctively want to
protect American jobs, thinking that this is the way to protect our economy.
The pressure, described above, that was put on the New Jersey legislature to
pass an outright ban on outsourcing for state contracts is a clear example of
this grassroots protectionism. On the other hand, proponents of
globalization see this protectionism as short-sighted, likely to result in
retaliatory action by trade partners and so ultimately harmful to the
American economy. This battle is apparently being fought at both the state
and federal levels, with the proponents of globalization keeping most of
these proposed bans from becoming law. If this first round of state and
federal outsourcing bans faces successful legal challenges, this should blunt
the onslaught of proposed outsourcing legislation. If, on the other hand,
these first statutes remain unchallenged or are challenged unsuccessfully,
many more versions of outsourcing bans will likely find their way out of
committees and onto governors' desks.
E. Indirect State Bans on Outsourcing Through Preferences
Another popular approach to limiting outsourcing involves statutes
that express preferences for in-state or in-country goods and services. This
particular approach to limiting outsourcing does not, at this point, have any
counterparts on the federal level. While New Jersey's outsourcing ban is
the only one to actually become law in the last two years, within that same
time period, seven states have actually enacted statutes that include
preferences for local goods and services.7 °  In addition, legislation
68 GPA, supra note 39, Annex 2, app. 1, reprinted in I LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 157 (Joseph F. Dennin et al. eds., 2000).
69 See H. 1317, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 2005 Colo. Sess. Laws 1485; H. 514,
Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2005).
70 See S.J. Res. 234, 2004; Leg., Reg. Sess., 2004 Ala. Acts 311; Colo. H. 1317; S. 1723,
94th Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. (111.); H. Enrolled Act. 1080, 113th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2004); H. 1414, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 164; S. 2344,
103rd Gen Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1481.
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mandating preferences is pending in three states.7' Finally, on the executive
level, the governors of Indiana and Minnesota have issued Executive Orders
calling for preferences for state goods and services.
72
A look at the state statutes mandating preferences will outline the
concept behind these initiatives. The basic principle of "preference"
statutes is to favor local goods and services over non-local goods and
services. Most of these statutes define "local" as in-state.73 However, some
statutes define "local" as in-country.74 Sometimes the state statute requires
preferences on specific products, as the Colorado statute that mandates an
in-state preference for agricultural products. Again, Tennessee's statute
mandates an in-country preference for data entry and call center services.
75
Another variable involves the strength of the preference. For example,
Illinois requires a preference in procurement decisions for goods
manufactured in the United States,76 while Alabama simply "encourages" a
preference for professional services based in Alabama, rather than
mandating such a preference.77 Since these "preference" statutes involve
the award of state contracts, several statutes use the contract process as the
basis for preferences. Thus, Indiana provides price preferences of between
one and five percent for Indiana companies when awarding state contracts,
while North Dakota prefers state contracts over others when the bids are
equal.78 While less direct than outright bans, the purpose of these
"preference" statutes is the same as the purpose of the bans: to keep
American jobs from going overseas.
F. Legal Validity of State Bans on Outsourcing Through Preferences
As with state statutes that require an outright ban on outsourcing, state
statutes that attack outsourcing more indirectly through the use of
preferences will likely be found invalid if challenged in courts. While these
"preference" statutes do not apparently interfere with federal foreign
powers rights, as a class, they clearly violate the Constitution's Foreign
71 See S. 66, 55t" Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); H. 4102, 2005 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mich.);
H. 3742, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005).
72 Exec. Order No. 05-05 (Jan. 10, 2005), 28(6) Ind. Reg. 1892 (March 1, 2005),
available at http://www.in.gov/idoa/2736.htm; Exec. Order No. 04-02, 28(40) Minn. Reg.
1214 (April 5th, 2004).
73 See Ala. S.J. Res. 234; Colo. H. 1317; Ind. H. Enrolled Act. 1080; H. 1091, 59th Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2005).
" See 2005 I11. S. 1723; N.C. H. 1414; Tenn. S. 2344.
75 See Tenn. S. 2344.
76 See 2005 I11. S. 1723.
77 See Ala. S.J. Res. 234.
78 See Ind. H. Enrolled Act. 1080; N.D. H. 1091.
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Commerce Clause.79 In addition, those statutes that require preference not
just for American goods, but also for goods from a particular state run the
danger of violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause 80 and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.8'
Since the Foreign Commerce Clause also gives the federal government
authority to regulate interstate commerce, all state "preference" statutes
whether they require the use of in-state goods and services or in-country
goods and services may easily be seen as interfering with interstate
commerce.82 The Foreign Commerce Clause, in giving authority over
interstate commerce to the state, suggests that states cannot make laws
restricting commerce outside their borders, whether the law restricts
commerce with other states or with a foreign country. 83 In cases involving
the Foreign Commerce Clause and interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
has, in fact, established a "per se" rule that state statutes which require
outright protectionism are invalid even though the state may be pursuing a
legitimate local economic interest. 84 The Court's guidance here is explicit
and suggests that these "preference" laws are not legally viable.
There is one approach, however, that may render some state
"preference" laws viable under the Foreign Commerce Clause. This
approach was used in a recent Third Circuit decision. Trojan Technologies,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania85 considered whether state statutes can mandate that
companies performing work for state contracts "Buy American." The Third
Circuit upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required that all state contracts
include a provision that any steel used in public works construction projects
must be made in the United States. Here, the court found that this statute
did not interfere with the federal government's foreign affairs power.86 In
reaching this conclusion, the court extended the "market participant"
exception, formulated for interstate commerce cases, to foreign commerce.
Using this construct, the court found that the Pennsylvania statute merely
allowed the state to operate as any private market participant might, rather
than giving the state unwarranted regulatory control. 87 Whether or not the
"market participant" exception can, in reality, be applied in this context to
either interstate or foreign commerce is, at this point, uncertain. In fact, a
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'0 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
81 Id. art. IV,§ 1,cl. 1.
82 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83 See KLINGER& SYKES, supra note 35, at 12.
84 See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
" 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990).
86 See id.
87 Inc. Vill. of Rockville Ctr. v. Town of Hempstead, 196 F.3d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 1999).
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California circuit court, in Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Board of
Commissioners,88 reached an opposite conclusion about "Buy American"
statutes, striking down the California statute as unconstitutional because it
encroached on the federal government's power to create uniform foreign
commerce policies. The Supreme Court has not yet definitely resolved
whether or not the "market participant" doctrine can actually be applied to
foreign commerce cases. If, however, the Supreme Court decides to allow
the Third Circuit's analysis to stand, the "market participant" strategy might
provide a concept on which to build state anti-outsourcing laws that will
pass constitutional muster.
For state statutes that require in-state preferences, the possible legal
challenges go beyond the Foreign Commerce Clause. In fact, when these
statutes involve restricting commerce with other states, they may also
potentially violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.
This clause prohibits a state from discriminating against residents of other
states by denying them the same privileges and immunities granted to its
own citizens. 89 Under the terms of this Clause, a state may discriminate
against non-residents in hiring for state jobs, but may not discriminate
against non-residents working for private companies who are fulfilling state
contracts.90  Judicial history in cases involving the Privileges and
Immunities Clause suggests that to prevail, these state statutes would have
to meet two conditions. First, these statutes would need to address a
situation where the non-residents represented a "peculiar source of evil"
which was not simply related to economic protectionism.9' This condition
underscores the judiciary's concern that the evil being addressed be shown
concretely to actually exist.92 Next, the remedy proposed in the state statute
would have to be narrowly tailored to the purported evil being addressed.93
A survey of the state statutes establishing preferences for in-state goods and
88 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
89 See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2003)
(illustrating that a New York statute which discriminated against non-resident holders of
valid New York lobstering permits by denying them access to New York waters violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution).
90 See A.L. Blades & Sons, Inc. v. Yerusalim, 121 F.3d 865, 871 (3d Cir. 1997).
91 See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bemardi, 730 F.2d 486, 497 (7th Cir. 1984).
92 See Crotty, 346 F.3d at 97 (striking down a statute which placed residency
requirements on insurance consultants because the state did not provide any evidence to
prove that these non-resident consultants represented any possible harm to state residents).
93 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (holding that an Alaska statute favoring in-
state workers was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunity Clause because the
preference established did not bear a clear relationship to the "evil" against which it was
defending). The Hicklin court stated that for "a policy which may present serious
constitutional questions" to be valid, the means by which it addresses the perceived evil
"must be more closely tailored to aid the unemployed the Act is intended to benefit." Id. at
528.
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services suggests that these statutes may not meet the threshold for validity
established by the Privileges and Immunities Clause since the "evil"
addressed is uniformly economic competition.
Another legal hurdle for in-state "preference" statutes is the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause. This clause mandates that
states respect each other's policies. It also establishes that no state need
honor another state's policy which conflicts with its own policy. 94 Klinger
and Sykes give a relevant example of possible problems these statutes
might create under the Full Faith and Credit Clause:95 Indiana's "Buy
Indiana" policy might well clash with the policy of another state, perhaps
Wisconsin. If a Wisconsin resident sues Indiana in Wisconsin for damages
caused by the policy, Wisconsin will not be required to violate its own
policy in order to uphold Indiana law. In fact, this example suggests a
fundamental problem that exists with these laws.
The intent behind the three constitutional clauses discussed in this
section is to maintain a coherent framework of commerce policy that will
prevent a patchwork of state laws that contradict each other and could well
lead to increasingly hostile relations between the states. In fact, the
perceived "enemy" in the outsourcing issue is the foreign worker who takes
American jobs. But, in reality, some of these state preference laws in a real
sense cast the "enemy" as the residents of the state next door. To avoid
these interstate problems, state "preference" statutes might follow the lead
of the statutes described above which define "local" as in-country rather
than in-state.
G. Indirect State and Federal Bans on Outsourcing Through Limits on Data
Transmission
Privacy is an important concern in the United States today, and
outsourcing appears to present another substantial threat to privacy. When
service jobs are outsourced, the data the workers need to perform their work
must follow. Thus, as outsourcing mushrooms, so does the amount of
financial, health, and other personal data that leaves the country. Not
surprisingly, then, bills which attempt to limit outsourcing by controlling
the transmission of personal data to overseas destinations have proliferated
on both the state and federal levels. While none of these bills has yet been
enacted into law, there are at least ten such bills pending in state
legislatures 96 and at least five high-profile bills pending in Congress. 97 In
94 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979)
(explaining the parameters of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
95 See KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 35, at 15.
96 See Legis. B. 203, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005); S. 614, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2005); H. 1377, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005); S. 60, 65th.Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005);
S. 1597, 228th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H. 1045, 94th Gen. Assemb. (I11. 2005);
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general, these bills prohibit entities from sending private information
overseas without express permission from the consumer. Most often, the
information these bills seek to protect is financial information or healthcare
information, but one bill actually prohibits the transmission of voter data
overseas.
98
Sponsors of these anti-outsourcing bills often cite privacy concerns as
their sole motivation,99 but limits on data transmission are, in reality, a
major deterrent to outsourcing. In particular, if health and financial data
cannot be transmitted overseas without permission, call centers in foreign
countries will have a difficult time retrieving the data needed to provide the
services they were hired to provide. In fact, such limitations on data
transmission could serve as a powerful motivator for companies to return
such call centers to the United States. 00
H. Legal Validity of Proposed Limits on Overseas Data Transmission
State and federal opponents of outsourcing have found, in these bills
calling for limits on transmitting data overseas, a potentially potent tool for
curtailing outsourcing of service-based jobs. However, as with the other
types of legislation discussed above, there are legal impediments to this
type of legislation. The first problem is that both state and federal bills to
ban transmission of data overseas without permission may well violate the
GPA and other trade agreements to which the United States is a party,'0 1
similarly to the way in which the Thomas-Voinovich Amendment violates
H. 6641, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); H. 418, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005); S. 1463,
84th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005); H. 3320, 73d Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2005).
97 See Personal Data Offshoring Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4366, 108th Cong. (2004);
SAFE-ID Act, S. 2312, 108th Cong. (2004); United States Workers Protection Act of 2004,
H.R. 3820, 108th Cong. (2004); Senator Clinton Calls for New Privacy Bill of Rights to
Protect Americans' Personal Information, June 16, 2006, http://www.senate.gov
/-clinton/news/statements/details.cfm?id=257234 (detailing Clinton's proposal for the
Privacy Rights and Oversight for Electronic and Commercial Transactions Act of 2006,
which prohibits sending data overseas); David Carney, News From June 1-5, 2004, TECH
L.J., http://www.techlawjoumal.com/home/newsbriefs/2004/06a.asp (noting introduction of
the Increasing Notice of Foreign Outsourcing Act, S. 2472, 108th Cong. (2004)).
98 See Global Sourcing Information, supra note 29 (citing California Bill).
99 Letter from Edward J. Markey, Congressman from Massachusetts, to Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et. al. 3 (Feb. 23, 2004)
(on file with author) (voicing strong distrust of outsourcing personal information: "In their
rush to cut costs and increase their bottom line.., companies may be sacrificing the privacy
protections the law affords to American citizens by transferring sensitive information to
offshore companies.").
100 Adam Mordecai, Anti-Offshoring Legislation: The New Wave of Protectionism-The
Backlash Against Foreign Outsourcing of American Service Jobs, 5 RICH J. GLOBAL L. &
Bus. 85, 105 (2005).
101 See GPA, supra note 39.
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these trade agreements-by failing to give treaty signatories treatment
comparable to the treatment received by domestic entities. If service
providers in the United States can more easily access the financial and
health information necessary to perform their duties than services providers
outside of the United States can retrieve this data, then these two classes of
service providers are not being treated comparably, as required by the GPA.
In effect, the promise that all GPA signatories will be treated equally will
have been broken and the United States may be found in violation of this
trade agreement. State laws that transgress international trade agreements
may also be impermissibly interfering with federal foreign policy power.
In addition to potential trade agreement violations, proposed state bans
on overseas data transmission must clear another hurdle that proposed
federal bans do not face. These state bills, if enacted into law, may well be
preempted by several federal privacy laws already in force: the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), ° 2 the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 10 3 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 ("GLB").10 4 In fact, the FCRA has recently been amended to
specifically preempt any attempts by state agencies to tighten controls on
sharing credit information beyond what the FCRA allows.10 5  HIPAA
allows the sharing of health information between business associates within
established parameters with specified consents. 0 6 Likewise, GLB allows
the sharing of financial information between affiliates, again within
established parameters and with specified consents. 0 7 The key point here,
however, is that none of these federal privacy laws makes a distinction
between business associates or affiliates that are located within the United
States and business associates or affiliates that are located outside the
102 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1681 (1970)).
103 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
104 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (1999)).
105 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § § 1681-1681). The Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACT") amends the FCRA to strengthen its
preemption power over state statutes. Id. FACT specifically precludes state laws from
imposing stricter limits on financial data transmission than the provision in the FCRA that
the consumer be given the opportunity to opt out of the data transmission loop. Id.
106 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) (2002) provides that covered entities may "disclose
protected health information to a business associate, and may allow a business associates to
create or receive protected health information ... if the covered entity obtains satisfactory
assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information."
'0' 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (1999). The conditions imposed on such transmission by
GLB require full disclosure to consumers that this information will be shared with third
parties as well as contracts with the third parties that require confidentiality.
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United States. Thus, state laws that make such a distinction may be found
to be in conflict with their federal counterparts and so preempted by the
federal laws.
It is important to note here that both HIPAA and GLB explicitly state
that they do not preempt state laws that provide stricter standards for
protecting transmitted information. 10 8 However, even when the federal law
explicitly limits its own preemptive power, a state statute will be preempted
if it actually conflicts with the federal law.109 One might clearly argue that
state laws that make a distinction between affiliates located in the United
States and those located outside the United States are in definite conflict
with federal laws that make no such distinction.
In fact, one clash between a state privacy law and federal privacy laws
has already been resolved by the courts in favor of the federal law's
preemptive power. In American Bankers Association v. Lockyer," ° the
Bankers Association sought a ruling that the FACT Amendment to the
FCRA specifically preempted a California statute that imposed stricter
standards on international data transmission than did the federal law. The
lower court found that FACT preempted only part of the California law, the
portion dealing with credit report information. However, the opt-out
provision which gave consumers more control over the use of their
information was upheld by the lower court. Here, the court noted that the
GLB specifically allows states to pass more restrictive privacy laws
regarding financial information than those enacted on the federal level.
The Bankers Association immediately appealed to the Ninth Circuit."'
Interestingly, the Federal Trade Commission joined the Bankers
Association in this appeal, suggesting the strong interest the federal
government has in preserving its power to create a coherent policy on
outsourcing, which will not be diluted by the states. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision and found that FACT did indeed
preempt the California statute.' 2 This decision appeared to turn on the
issue identified above-whether the states have the right to distinguish the
kinds of information that will be available to affiliates inside the United
States and the kinds of information that will be available to affiliates
outside of the United States. In the first skirmish over this issue, then,
federal preemptive power has prevailed. However, California is appealing
this decision. Until the Supreme Court resolves this issue, the skirmishing
will no doubt continue. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lockyer
108 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264 (c); Gramn-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act § 6802(b)(2).
109 See Holcombe, supra note 52, at 566.
110 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004).
111 See Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d. 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).
112 See id.
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suggests that the analysis that secs these state restrictions on overseas data
transmission as different in kind from the federal privacy laws, rather than
merely stricter versions of the same policy, may ultimately prevail.
As suggested by the debate in Lockyer, these proposed state privacy
laws also seem to interfere with the federal power to maintain a uniform
foreign affairs framework. In addition, interfering with outsourcing under
the cloak of protecting privacy might also be seen as touching on the
foreign commerce arena and so violating the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Privacy concerns are pressing and legitimate concerns in today's climate.
These concerns are not likely, however, to trump federal interest in
supporting globalization, given the variety of legal obstacles facing laws
that propose restrictions on transmitting data overseas.
I. Indirect State and Federal Bans on Outsourcing Through Disclosure
Requirements
1. Disclosure of Outsourcing
Attempts to regulate disclosure requirements take two forms:
requirements that contractors reveal where work will be done and
requirements that workers in call centers disclose their locations. One state,
North Carolina, has actually enacted a statute of the first type. This statute
requires all vendors bidding for state contracts to disclose where the
contract work will be performed, specifically whether the work will be
performed outside the United States. Four states have such laws pending
13
and one state governor has vetoed a statute which would mandate disclosure
of outsourcing.' 14 In addition to the pending legislation that would force
disclosure, three states have enacted laws that mandate creation of
commissions to study outsourcing, with the clear intent of emphasizing the
extent of the practice.11 5 One of these statutes, the New Jersey statute,
actually sets out to "study ways to reduce outsourcing and offshoring in the
State." 6 Finally, five governors have issued executive orders mandating
the study of outsourcing, again, with the clear intent of highlighting the
extent to which outsourcing has affected their state.' 17  Thus, the states
113 See H. 418, 84th Legis. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005); H. 36, 189th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005); S. 1597, 228th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S. 322, 106th Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2004).
114 See A.B. 1829, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (vetoed by Governor
Schwarzenegger).
115 See 2005 Me. Laws 47; 2005 N.J. Laws 184; 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 8497.
116 See 2005 N.J. Laws 184.
117 Bush Exec. Order No. 04-45, Fla. (2005); Pawlenty Exec. Order No. 04-02 Minn.,
(2004); McGreevey Exec. Order No. 129, N.J. (2004); Holden Exec. Order No. 04-09, Mo.
(2004); Easley Exec. Order No. 6, N.C. (2003).
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have attempted to heighten public awareness of outsourcing through use of
several tactics.
On the federal level, a similar bill is pending in Congress. The Jobs
for America Act of 2004 amends the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act. 1 8 This amendment requires that, when jobs are being
moved offshore, covered entities provide notice of how many jobs are being
outsourced, the location to which they are being outsourced and why these
jobs are being outsourced.1 9 Clearly, both state and federal legislators see
mandatory disclosure that workers are being outsourced as a method for
arousing public awareness of outsourcing and generating pressure to ban or
limit such movement of jobs overseas.
2. Disclosure of Call Center Locations
The motivation behind the bills pending that would require workers in
call centers to identify their location on the state and federal level is similar.
Presently, there are no actual statutes enacted on either the state or federal
level that would mandate disclosure of the location of call centers.
However, there are fourteen state bills pending that would require that
workers in call centers disclose their location. 2  Some of these bills also
include more specific restrictions. For example, the Minnesota, Illinois,
Oregon, and Florida statutes require not only that the call center worker
reveal his or her location, but also that the worker switch the call back to the
United States if the caller so demands.' 2' Mississippi's statute also requires
that the call center location be disclosed at the very start of a call.
22
Finally, Iowa's statute includes a preference for awarding state contracts to
entities whose call centers will be located in the United States.
23
On the federal level, Senator Kerry introduced a bill that is pending in
the Senate, entitled Call Center Consumer's Right to Know Act of 2003.124
Similar to the state bills described above, this bill mandates that a call
118 Jobs for America Act, S. 2090, 108th Cong. (2004).
119 Id. at 2(e).
120 See H. 214, 2005 leg., 120th Sess. (Miss. 2005); S. 614, 107th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2005); A.B. 840, 211 th Leg., First Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2005); S. 1266, 47th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2005); H. 2464, 81st Leg., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005); H. 553, 81st Gen.
Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2005); H. 1045, 94th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (I11. 2005); H.
6641, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); S. 775, 84th Legis. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 2005); H. 953, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005); H. 3320, 73d Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2005); H.
800, Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. (N.C. 2005); H. 3362, 184th Gen. Court (Mass. 2005); S.
272, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
121 See S. 614, 170th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); H. 1045, 94th Gen. Assemb. (I11. 2005); S.
775, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Minn. 2005); H. 3320, 73d Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2005).
122 See H. 214, 120th Sess. (Miss. 2005).
123 See H. 553, 81st Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. (Iowa 2005).
124 Call Center Consumer's Right to Know Act, S. 1873, 108th Cong. (2003).
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center employee disclose the location of the center at the beginning of every
call. Interestingly, this bill defines a "call center" as "a location that
provides customer-based service and sales assistance or technical assistance
and expertise to individuals located in the United States via telephone, the
Internet or other telecommunications and information technology."
1 25
Clearly, the Kerry bill is looking forward to the various permutations call
centers may experience in the near future. This bill also includes reporting
requirements and penalties for non-compliance.
26
3. Legal Validity of State Disclosure Requirements
The pending federal legislation mandating outsourcing disclosure does
not run the risk of interfering with federal foreign affairs and foreign
commerce powers. However, as with other state anti-outsourcing
approaches, the state measures described in this section may be invalidated
by the courts because they interfere with federal foreign affairs power and
the Foreign Commerce Clause. There has been no significant judicial
challenge to such laws, so the effectiveness of this particular anti-
outsourcing strategy is unknown. These bills do not actually ban
outsourcing, which puts them on sounder legal footing than the bills that
propose outright bans and preferences. However, the intent of these bills is
to arouse public sentiment against outsourcing with the hope that such
public anger will result in companies relocating workers and call center
functions back to the United States. If a number of these bills become law
and do in fact create a backlash that forces a significant number of workers
and call centers to relocate back to this country, an argument could be made
that these mandates for disclosure are infringing on federal foreign affairs
power. Such a result would prevent the federal government from
constructing a consistent economic policy that supports globalization.
J. Indirect State and Federal Bans on Outsourcing Through Subsidy
Incentives
The final category of anti-outsourcing bill attempts to use state and
federal subsidies and tax incentives to counter outsourcing. The significant
fact about this type of legislation is that it potentially affects private
companies working on private contracts with the help of state or federal
subsidies. Thus, the reach of these proposals is potentially broader than the
previously discussed legislation that only reaches to companies working on
public contracts.
There have been no such bills actually enacted on the state level, but
125 Id. at 2(d).
126 Id. at 2(b)-(c).
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there are five incentive bills pending in state legislatures. 127 The following
examples summarize the nature of this category of bill. New York's
proposal would prohibit any entity that received assistance from the State to
move its workers from New York. This bill would also require companies
to return any state assistance they had already received in the event that
they did leave New York. Finally, recipients of New York aid that offshore
jobs would not be eligible for aid from New York for five years from the
date the outsourcing was discovered. 128  Similarly, Connecticut has a
pending bill that proposes to cut off any state aid for seven years to
companies that outsource more than 100 jobs. 2 9  Other bills, like
Washington State's anti-outsourcing bill, use tax incentives to discourage
outsourcing. Washington's bill stipulates that tax incentives will only be
awarded to companies who agree to create more jobs within the State of
Washington than they export out of the state.' 30 In addition to bills pending
in the state legislature, Michigan's governor has issued an executive order
following this same tactic. This order seeks to encourage companies to
keep workers in the United States by issuing a prohibition on the use of
certain state funds to aid in outsourcing workers from the United States.'
This type of legislation obviously uses financial incentives to
encourage companies not to outsource. Since none of these bills have
actually become law yet, the success of this strategy is not yet known.
However, should such a bill become law, affected companies will clearly
calculate whether they will make more money by accepting state subsidies
or by moving workers and operations to a locale where the cost of doing
business is significantly cheaper.
On the federal level, there is one pending bill and one actual statute in
this category. The pending bill, the United States Workers Protection Act
of 2005, discussed above, contains a financial incentive to discourage
outsourcing. 132 This bill prohibits federal aid to a state unless that state
certifies that it will not use the federal money to procure any goods or
127 See H.R. 388, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005); Assemb. 1213, 2005 Leg., 228th
Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S. 175, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); H.R. 524, 159th
Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2005); H.D. 3000, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
128 See Assemb. 9567, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2004); S. 6040, 2004 Leg., 227th
Sess. (N.Y. 2004). The New York bill runs the danger of causing tension with other states
since the wording of the bill provides financial disincentives for moving to "an outside
locality." This could conceivably cause interstate friction as described in the discussion of
bills proposing preferences for in-state goods and services.
129 H.R. 5660, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2004).
130 H.R. 2762, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004).
131 State of Michigan, Office of the Governor (Jennifer M. Granholm), Exec. Directive
No. 2004-2 (2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168-36898_36900-
88888--,00.html.
132 United States Workers Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3406, 109th Cong. (2005).
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services coming from overseas. The federal "incentive" legislation, which
has actually been signed into law by President Bush, uses a somewhat
different "financial incentive" strategy. Rather than tying federal aid to
local jobs, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 implements changes in
the tax code that protect American manufacturing jobs."
This statute is, in actuality, a response to a retaliatory action by the
European Union. The EU believed that certain U.S. tax frameworks
violated international trade agreements, and, in retaliation, imposed
sanctions that hurt the competitiveness of U.S. products in world markets.
This loss of competitiveness, in turn, threatened U.S. jobs. To enhance the
competitiveness of American products and increase the economic rewards
for keeping operations in the United States, the American Jobs Creation Act
revamped the offending tax frameworks. Senator Hutchinson described the
motivation behind this bill as follows: "We have to act to give our
manufacturers every possible advantage we can to be competitive with
Europe. That is what the heart of this bill is. It is very important for jobs in
our country. It is very important for the manufacturers who are trying to
keep jobs in our country to be able to have that level playing field."'
34
In spite of Senator Hutchinson's supportive words, however, there is
an interesting irony here. This financial incentive for keeping American
jobs in the United States was, in reality, forced on the United States by its
global trading partners. The American Jobs Creation Act is a clear example
of how globalization works. In a global economy where the United States
has agreed with its trading partners on certain conditions, failure to adhere
to those conditions hurt U.S. competitiveness in the world market. Thus,
the United States was forced to honor its treaty obligations in order to
maintain its competitiveness. In this case, then, it was the European Union,
not the United States, who motivated this favorable tax structure change
that makes it easier for American industry to keep doing business in the
United States. In this case, globalization itself appears to have prevented
outsourcing.
K. Legal Validity of State Use of Financial Incentives to Discourage
Outsourcing
Again, the federal legislation in this area faces no obvious legal
hurdles since this legislation cannot run counter to federal foreign affairs
power or the Foreign Commerce Clause. While the legal validity of
pending state anti-outsourcing measures is less clear, in reality, this
133 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
134 CONG. REC. S. 11202 (online ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (Senate Floor Speech of Sen. Kay
Bailey Hutchinson).
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financial incentive strategy for discouraging outsourcing is less problematic
than are some of the previously discussed strategies. In all contexts, the
decision on how to use state monies is a prerogative that rightly belongs to
state governments. Even if this particular use of the prerogative tends to
resemble bribery, state governments have the right to set their own
parameters for disbursing state money. However, this type of bill clearly
has the potential for interfering with federal predominance in foreign affairs
and foreign commerce. As with all of the anti-outsourcing measures
described in this paper, these "financial incentive" measures, especially if
enacted by a large number of states, could threaten the U.S. Government's
ability to construct and maintain a coherent economic policy based on
globalization, and so could be subject to judicial challenge.
L. Conclusions About State and Federal Attempts to Limit Outsourcing
The legislative rush to protect American workers has been more
aggressive on the state level than on the federal level. However, while
many bills have been proposed in both the state and federal arena, only a
few of these bills have actually been enacted into law. Many continue to
spend a long time in committees. This suggests that America's legislative
bodies are well aware of the challenges, likely successful in many cases,
that such enacted statutes would face. As long as the federal government
supports an economic policy based on globalization, state statutes clearly
face preemption by the federal government's constitutional right to power
over foreign policy and foreign commerce. In addition, state statutes face
preemption by existing state laws in some instances. Federal statutes will
not run afoul of the federal government's prerogatives in foreign affairs and
foreign commerce. However, these statutes will often violate the
international treaties that the United States has signed. In such cases,
application of these statutes could result in economic sanctions that could
hurt the U.S. economy.
Of the strategies represented in these various bills, the one which is
least likely to be upheld, and most likely to cause destructive negative
retaliation by other countries, is the attempt to ban outsourcing on state and
federal contracts, either directly or indirectly through enforcement of
preferences. These bills represent the most direct attack on outsourcing-
and on federal prerogatives in foreign affairs and foreign commerce-
because they attempt to thwart the results of a free trade policy that the
federal government supports. They also represent the most direct attack on
various trade agreements to which the United States is a party. Limiting
data transmission abroad, while popular with a public concerned with
privacy, is a strategy that is highly susceptible to preemption by federal
privacy laws already in effect. On the other hand, the strategy most likely
to result in viable laws, is the use of financial incentives in the form of state
aid or tax preferences. State and federal bills that encompass this strategy
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are based on a power that governments clearly possess-the power to
control disbursement of their funds. How effective this strategy would be at
curtailing outsourcing, however, is unclear. The strategy of mandating
disclosure of outsourcing plays to public indignation at the loss of
American jobs and national pride. By themselves, state and federal
disclosure bills will not save American jobs, but they will cause the extent
of the problem to be disclosed, which may foment enough public pressure
on corporations to stem the tide of outsourcing a bit.
In short, the current spate of anti-outsourcing legislation seems largely
fueled by politics rather than sound jurisprudence. However, the concerns
this legislation addresses are legitimate. Outsourcing has led to current
hardship for many Americans. American jobs are being lost, in part,
because American workers have more rights and foreign workers demand
less money. Thus, in one sense, corporations who are increasing profits
through outsourcing are lining their pockets by taking advantage of
substandard labor conditions.
Likewise, while American workers are more highly paid, the standard
of living is higher in this country, as is the cost of living. On the other
hand, economists are quick to point out that globalization may well
strengthen the U.S. economy in the long term. The federal government
should take the lead in addressing the conflicts caused by its support of free
trade, since state laws are all subject to preemption by federal policy.
Congress must design a coherent set of statutes that will support
globalization's positive effects while discouraging its negative effects.
Such legislation must go beyond the protectionism evident in the current
spate of state and federal bills and grapple with ways to use globalization to
strengthen our economy.
IV. THE WTO RESPONSE
The equilibrium in international trade and the efforts to level the
playing around the world can be traced to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") in 1947 and the successive rounds now administered
by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") based in Geneva. 35 One
commentator noted that:
Although the international trading regime is not directed to
addressing the rights of foreign investors on an individual basis, the
WTO framework is significant for creating a level playing field for
trade. For instance the WTO Agreements retain two key principles
from the original 1947 GATT Agreement-national treatment and
most favored nation (MFN) treatment. These concepts are
particularly important for offshore outsourcing arrangements because
3 See Holcombe, supra note 52, at 596 (discussing the history of the WTO).
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each ensures a baseline level of fairness. 1
36
However, it is not surprising that the WTO solution is a kind of after-
the-fact remedy that may take years to enforce. There is no immediate
solution. The problem will develop if each country retreats into a
protectionist mode that will trigger a wave of counter protectionism and
culminate in a death spiral for free trade.
An example of the disagreement about free trade centers on gambling.
The United States claims that gambling was clearly excluded from the
scope of any WTO agreement and intent to free up regulation. The WTO
announced that on July 19, 2006 it would establish a panel "to investigate
whether United States restrictions on Internet gambling comply with
international trade rules."'1 37 A previous ruling had found that the U.S. laws
were not in compliance with WTO standards. The panel would be able to
issue a decision in ninety days but it could be appealed. Antigua, in the
Caribbean, filed a case in 2003.
The office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") issued
a report on April 21, 2006 in which it updated its position on the gambling
dispute. The USTR stated that in their view the sole dispute was over
whether "US laws do not discriminate against foreign suppliers of remote
gambling on horse racing."'138 The United States claims that it is in
compliance. 139 They claim that the measure "to protect public morals or and
to maintain public order is provided for under Article XIV (a) of GATS. ''l4°
Antigua and Barbuda won against the United States. 
41
A further example of the divergent views on gambling can be seen in
the United States arrest of the CEO of BetOnSports, a British company.
He was arrested during a layover in Dallas-Ft. Worth as he was traveling
from Great Britain to Costa Rica. 142  Subjecting executives to criminal
136 Id. at 597 (citations omitted).
137 WT.O. Panel Will Investigate U.S. Limits on Online Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2006, at C7.
138 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statements by Ambassador
Peter Allgeier, U.S. Representative to the WTO, at the meeting of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document
Library/Press-Releases/2006/April/Statements-by.Ambassador-Peter-Aligeier,-US-Repr
esentative to theWTO,_at the-meeting-of theWTODisputeSettlementBody_(DSB).
html?ht-.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 1E(4) (quoting General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994)).
141 See Holcombe, supra note 52, at 598-99.
142 Matt Richtel, An Arrest in Internet Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at C1
(discussing Mr. Carruthers arrest and how he had not thought that the United States could do
anything about this situation). GATS stands for "General Agreement on Trade in Services,
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charges and incarcerating an executive of a publicly traded British company
will certainly generate antipathy towards the United States and might spur
retaliatory action.
Divergent views about regulation are not new in the international
community. For example, China currently is considering regulations that
will make it difficult for large retailers to open stores like Wal-Mart. 4 3
Japan has been a market with many regulations making it more difficult for
foreign entities to do business there. If the current situation intensifies
where the United States discourages foreign investment, there will be an
escalating problem that will make the Wal-Mart in China problem seem
small.1 44 These disputes will no doubt land at the WTO as well.
V. SUPREME COURT CASES: TAX BREAKS TO KEEP BUSINESS
INCENTIVES V. PENALTIES
While the methods outlined in Section III do not seem to be effective,
tax incentives to encourage businesses to locate in a particular region
appear to help spur an insourcing surge. While some may question the
efficacy of tax breaks for businesses and whether that ultimately leads to
states losing businesses and their jobs because they compete with one
another, others argue it is an effective way to compete and to
counterbalance outsourcing.145 The Supreme Court in DaimlerChrysler v.
Cuno14 6 addressed this issue in 2006. The lawsuit, like many, has a
circuitous path. Initially the case was filed in state court alleging that the
"state tax credits and local property abatements that were granted to
Daimler Chrysler Corporation as an inducement to expand.. .discriminates
against interstate commerce."1 47 The district court dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim, however the Circuit Court reversed in part in 2004
which is a treaty the United States entered into as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations in
1995.
143 Fong, supra note 11 (noting that China is drafting new "rules to regulate large scale
shopping outlets which may benefit local companies at the expense of Wal-Mart and
Carrefour").
144 See also Editorial, The Don 't Invest in America Act, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2006 at A12
(editorial discussing the erection of barriers to insourcing as a result of the Dubai ports
fiasco).
145 See Eileen McNamara, Jobs Don't Negate Losses, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2006, at
B 1 (complaining about tax credits in Massachusetts used to attract Bristol Myers Squibb to
construct a plant at Fort Devins, bringing 550 new jobs). McNamara also notes the irony
that no effort is being made to save the 400 jobs lost when Gillette closed its manufacturing
plant at Fort Devins, calling it "corporate blackmail." Id.
146 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006), reh 'g denied 126 S. Ct. 2961
(June 26, 2006).
147 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing history
of the case), vacated in part by DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1868.
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and held: "We reverse that portion of the district court's judgment
upholding as constitutional the investment tax credit provision of Ohio Rev.
Code Ann.§ 5733.33 and we enjoin its enforcement.
'' 48
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, vacated in part and
remanded, holding that the taxpayers who objected to Toledo's granting of
the credit do not have standing and "therefore can proceed no further.',
149
In the Court's opinion, Justice Roberts noted:
State policymakers, no less than their federal counterparts, retain
broad discretion to make "policy decisions" concerning state
spending "in different ways. . . depending on their perceptions of
wise state fiscal policy and myriad other circumstances" Federal
courts may not assume a particular exercise of this state fiscal
discretion in establishing standing; a party seeking federal
jurisdiction cannot rely on such "[s]peculative inferences .. to
connect [his] injury to the challenged actions of [the defendant]."
Indeed, because state budgets frequently contain an array of tax and
spending provisions, any number of which may be challenged on a
variety of bases, affording state taxpayers standing to press such
challenges simply because their tax burden gives them an interest in
the state treasury would interpose federal courts as "'virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness"' of state fiscal
administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III envisions
for federal courts..
150
Thus the parties are left to the state court system to seek redress of
their claims. Businesses responded happily to the Court's ruling stating,
"we are pleased the court recognizes that a state's ability to provide these
important economic development incentives should not be vulnerable to
lawsuits by those not directly affected by the issue."'15' However, the
opposition by the plaintiffs attorney, Peter Enrich of Northeastern Law
School, noted that the decision "casts no doubt on the long line of court
rulings striking down discriminatory tax breaks as unconstitutional."' 52
If the Supreme Court had followed the Sixth Circuit opinion and struck
down a state's right to offer incentives, the United States would be
148 See id. at 750.
149 DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1859.
' Id. at 1863-64. (citations omitted).
151 David G. Savage, Big Corporate Tax Breaks Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at
A4 (quoting Dorothy Coleman, Vice President of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.); see also Jack
Tonfy, Supreme Court Ruling; Tax Breaks Can Be Used to Attract Companies, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 16, 2006, at 1A (discussing the positive impact of business and noting that
"the... decision could have a significant effect nationally because nearly every state uses
billions of dollars in tax breaks to attract companies").
152 Savage, supra note 154, at A4.
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uncompetitive with the rest of the world, which has aggressively offered tax
breaks for new factories. For example, Ireland staged its economic
resurgence in the 1990's in part based upon an incentive package it offered
to businesses willing to locate there. 153 China, too, has utilized the Special
Economic Zone ("SEZ") to stimulate growth and is considering expanding
this formula to revitalize and spur development in a number of secondary
cities inland. 5 4 While it remains to be seen what Ohio's state court will do
with the case, had the Supreme Court ruled otherwise, that coupled with the
high wage rates in the United States would have further sounded the death
knell for creation of new domestic jobs and fanned the flames for increasing
the pace of outsourcing of manufacturing and other jobs overseas. There is
a fundamental difference between tax incentives to locate new business in
the United States and the measures outlined in Section III.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress and state legislatures may be trying to fix a problem by
restricting outsourcing, but the cure may spark retaliation around the world
that ultimately hurts American citizens' interests.15  The anti-business
rhetoric of political parties, particularly recent Democratic candidates, has
polarized the debate. Benedict Arnold CEOs are not the problem. 156 In this
flat world that Thomas Freidman has described, competition is fierce. 157 It
is the business entrepreneur, like Bill Gates in India, who by expanding the
company overseas will also preserve the economic health of the company
and ultimately the future of jobs in the United States. 158 It will also be
critical to attract the Toyotas of the world to locate plants in the United
States. The United States, like many other countries, needs to find solutions
that create incentives for both American and foreign corporations to locate
within the States, thus stimulating job growth and economic
development. 1
59
153 See infra Part VI and note 164.
154 See infra Part VI and note 167.
155 See The Don't Invest in America Act, supra note 148, at A12 (editorially criticizing
Senators Shelby and Sarbane's proposal to require more scrutiny of foreign investment in
United States).
156 See Gail Russell Chaddock, Outsourcing Resonates in Virginia Race, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 21, 2004, at USA 2, (discussing the presidential race noting that "Kerry, who
has dubbed outsourcers 'Benedict Arnold CEOS' calls for ending tax credits for companies
that send jobs overseas and whenever possible, granting federal contracts to US workers");
Glenn Hubbard, Outsourcing is Good for America, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at 17
(discussing Senator Kerry's proposals to deal with Benedict Arnold CEOs on the Foreign
Tax Credit as well as Heinz's use of overseas sites).
157 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 7.
158 Dudley, supra note 4, at El.
159 See also David Wessel & Bob Davis, Pain from Free Trade Spurs Second Thoughts:
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Ireland's government has seized on this strategy and used tax
incentives to entice a number of businesses to locate facilities in its country.
In the early 1980's, Ireland introduced a 10% corporate tax rate for
manufacturing facilities. 160 Numerous other incentives exist as well. This
is a key component that the tax policy is "geared toward the promotion of a
job friendly environment in order to facilitate robust employment
growth." 16l While outsourcing can affect any environment, even Ireland,
the government of Ireland is funding "R&D and higher education at an
unprecedented level" to insure Ireland's continued prosperity.162
The Chinese models of SEZ have been very successful in spurring
economic development and job creation. 163  This includes five SEZ in
Shenzen, Xiamen, Zhuhai, Hantou, and Hainan as well as fourteen coastal
cities and Pudong as Economic and Technical Development Zones
"ETDZ").' 64 This has lead to impressive economic results placing China
fourth on a recent list of the world's biggest economies, behind the United
States, Japan, and Germany in 2005.16 Yet this economic and legal plan
that attracts foreign direct investment is also projected to hurtle China to the
number one position of GDP in 2040, followed closely b, the United
States, and then followed by India with less than half as much.
The United States may have a difficult time competing with foreign
sites as possibilities when individual companies must individually shoulder
Mr. Blinder's Shift Spotlights Warnings of Deeper Downside, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2007, at
Al (discussing Blinder's "contemplati[on of] changes to the tax code that would reward
companies that produce jobs that stay in the U.S." and idea that "focus should be on jobs
with person-to-person contact, regardless of pay and skill levels-from child day-care
providers to physicians.")
160 Suzanne Carter, Republic ofIreland: Not Quite So Taxing, LEGAL WK., Apr. 28, 2005.
161 Id.
162 But cf Michael Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment Success in Ireland: Can Poland
Duplicate Ireland's Economic Success Based on Foreign Direct Investment Policies?, 14
MIAMI INT. & COMP. L. REV. 65 (Summer 2006); Monika G. Kislowska, The Future of
Special Economic Zones in the Aftermath of Poland's Accession to the European Union, 5 J.
INT. Bus. & L. 174 (Spring 2006) (both discussing Poland's borrowing Ireland's successful
strategy for economic prosperity). See generally Arnold Alderman, A Repositioning
Strategy in the Wake of Outsourcing, POWER ELECTR. TECH., Mar. 1, 2005, at 68; see also
Neil Craig, Letter, Why Tax Cuts Would Lead to Economic Growth, THE HERALD, Jan. 9,
2007, at 12 (discussing that "corporate tax and regulatory cuts have led to 16 years of 7%
growth transforming it [Ireland] ....").
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Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L. LAW. 195, 202 (Spring 2001).
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166 Id. See also Jo Johnson & Edward Luce, India Pushes for Big Manufacturing
Expansion: Delhi Plans to Give States Special Economic Status to Aid the Sector's Global
Competitiveness, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at 2 (discussing India's recent moves to adopt
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the health care cost. If the United States were to find a solution so that
health care costs were not shouldered by business alone, this would greatly
increase the attractiveness of the locations in the United States for business.
Thus tax incentives play a critical role in making an environment attractive
to investors. The United States must face the challenge to competitiveness
by being creative with incentives and not resort to knee jerk reactionary
responses. For example, Vermont offers tax breaks for Vermont-based
insurers called "captives," which has made Vermont aggressively
competitive with many offshore financial havens like the Cayman
Islands. 167 Similarly, closing loopholes that encourage outsourcing would
also be a good first step.
168
The appeal of outsourcing bans is reminiscent of the British ban on
cotton. We must learn from history that these forces for change cannot be
fenced out. The attempt to make outsourcing illegal is like putting a finger
in the dike against the changes caused by the waves of globalization.
Providing incentives to attract business is the only realistic and possible
solution. We need to learn from Ireland and China that giving businesses
tax breaks does not mean losing money, but rather investing in future
economic growth will rebound to the benefit of all workers.
167 See generally Lynnley Browning, Vermont Becomes Offshore Insurance Haven, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at C1 (noting that over 560 companies have taken advantage of this and
making "captives" the 1 0 th largest employer in the state).
168 On May 3, 2007 Senator Byron Dorgan (Democrat from North Dakota) introduced
Senate Bill 1284, along with Senators Mikulski, Durbin, Stabenow, Rockefeller, Levin,
Feinstein, Johnson, Harkin, Feingold, Leahy, Kohl, and Kennedy, which "would end tax
deferral for the 'imported property' income of controlled foreign corporations." S. 1284,
110th Cong. (2007). In his message to Congress, Dorgan claimed "When a U.S. company
closed down a U.S. manufacturing plant, fires its American workers, and moves those good
paying jobs to China or other locations abroad, U.S. tax laws allow these firms to defer
paying any U.S. income taxes on the earnings from those now foreign-manufactured
products until those profits are returned, if ever, to this country." CONG. REc. S. 5571 (online
ed. May. 3, 2007) (Senate Floor Speech of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
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